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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 09-4073 
_______________ 
 
MARIO ROLANDO CRUZ AGUSTIN, 
                               Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
         Respondent 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
(No. A072-535-656) 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2010 
_______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 12, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Mario Rolando Cruz Agustin, a Guatemalan national with two United States 
citizen minor children who has lived in the United States since he fled Guatemala when 
he was 12 years old, timely appeals a final removal order by the Board of Immigration 
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Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA affirmed an immigration judge‟s (“IJ”) decision, after a 
hearing in 2008, that Agustin was statutorily ineligible for relief under Section 203 of the 
Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”).  See Pub.L. No. 105-100, 
111 Stat. 2160, 2193-2201 (1997), amended by Pub.L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644, 
2644-45 (1997).  The BIA also affirmed the IJ‟s denial of asylum,1 withholding of 
removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and discretionary 
cancellation of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), § 240A(b), 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).    
An application for special-rule cancellation of removal under NACARA is subject 
to the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).  See NACARA § 
203(b), 111 Stat. 2160, 2198-99.  However, § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not prevent us from 
considering questions of law or constitutional claims. See § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Questions of 
law include “not only „pure‟ issues of statutory interpretation, but also . . . mixed 
questions of law and fact.”  Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)).  Thus, we 
review Agustin‟s claims of legal and constitutional error for whether he has shown prima 
facie eligibility for special-rule cancellation of removal.   
                                              
1
 Agustin submitted an asylum application to the former Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”) on September 24, 1994, when he was 17 years old.  On June 12, 2007, 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served him with a Notice to Appear, 
alleging his removability from the United States.  He filed an amended asylum 
application on July 29, 2007.  His NACARA petition was signed on September 24, 2007.   
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Where the BIA adopts the findings of the IJ and also comments on the sufficiency 
of the IJ‟s determinations, we review the decisions of the BIA and the IJ.  See Kaita v. 
Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008).   
We grant the petition in regard to Agustin‟s NACARA claim, vacate, and remand 
to the BIA for further proceedings.  
*   *   *   *   * 
Guatemalan nationals must meet three requirements to be prima facie eligible for 
relief under Section 203 of NACARA.  An applicant must demonstrate that he or she (1) 
first entered the United States on or before October 1, 1990; (2) registered as an ABC 
class member
2
 on or before December 31, 1991; and (3) had not been apprehended at 
time of entry (or re-entry) after December 19, 1990.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.43(d)(2) 
(2009).   
The IJ stated in his oral decision that “[t]he real issue in this case was whether the 
respondent entered the United States on or before October 1, 1990.”  (IJ Op. at 3).  
Agustin‟s testimony, three corroborating affidavits, his 2007 interview with an asylum 
officer, and his NACARA and amended asylum applications, all state that he entered the 
United States in February 1990.  Nevertheless, the IJ made a “negative credibility 
determination” based on perceived inconsistencies regarding proof that Agustin entered 
                                              
2
 In a 1991 class-action settlement agreement, American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 
760 F.Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (ABC), the INS agreed not to deport Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran plaintiffs (“ABC class members”) and to provide new asylum interviews.  
NACARA streamlined the processing of many thousands of applications to the INS by 
ABC class members, who are eligible for special-rule cancellation of removal if they 
meet NACARA‟s statutory requirements.  
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the United States before October 1, 1990.  (IJ Op. at 4).  The IJ repeatedly stated, 
however, that Agustin would have been eligible for NACARA relief absent the 
credibility determination on “the [entry date] prong.”  Id. at 4 (“I do want to note that if 
the respondent is successful in an appeal on this issue I would have found him eligible 
under NACARA in terms of the merits.”).3 
The IJ‟s determination, as affirmed by the BIA, that Agustin did not make a prima 
facie case for cancellation of removal under NACARA has several problems.  First, the IJ 
stated in his oral decision that “the economic opportunities in Guatemala . . . are not as 
advantageous as here in the United States, which is why respondent would have left his 
country.”  Id. at 5.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that Agustin left his country 
for “economic opportunities” as the IJ speculated, nor did the Government make such an 
argument at any time in these proceedings.  We have held that, in administrative 
proceedings such as the one at issue here, an alien is entitled to due process.  Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 671 (3d 
Cir. 1990)).  “[D]ue process requires . . . (1) „factfinding based on a record produced 
before the decisionmaker and disclosed to‟ him or her.”  Id. at 549 (citing Llana-
Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994)).  Thus, it was legal error for the IJ 
to base a credibility determination, whether in whole or in part, on his own speculation 
rather than the record before him.  See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 
                                              
3
 The IJ later stated that “if [Agustin] is able to overcome these credibility problems . . .[,] 
I would have found that he would have been successful in his case for NACARA.” (IJ 
Op. at 5).  
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2003) (an adverse credibility determination may not be “based on speculation or 
conjecture, rather than on evidence in the record”) (internal citation omitted); Lin v. 
Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2006) (“we will vacate” an adverse credibility 
determination “if it is based on flawed reasoning, such as speculation or conjecture, or an 
inappropriately stringent standard”). 
Second, it goes too far to conflate minor, non-dramatic inconsistencies with 
purposeful falsehoods.  Cf. Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that “an IJ may not rest an adverse credibility finding on non-dramatic putative 
contradictions or incongruities in an alien's narrative without first giving the applicant a 
chance to reconcile the testimony”).  The IJ stated that Agustin‟s “own testimony is 
inconsistent today with the date given by his aunt, his uncle and his friend.”  (IJ Op. at 7).  
That characterization is at best an exaggeration of the record.  For example, the IJ 
discredited the affidavit provided by Agustin‟s friend, Oscar Zepeda-Lucero, because of 
his description of whom Agustin lived with when he arrived in the United States.  
Agustin testified that he lived with his uncle Hermelindo upon arrival.  According to the 
IJ, Zepeda-Lucero “said [Agustin] was living with a friend and did not say it was the 
uncle.”  Id.  However, Zepeda-Lucero‟s affidavit did correctly state that Agustin lived 
with “Hermelindo,” although it described him as a friend rather than an uncle.  
Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 496.  In an affidavit describing events that occurred 
more than 18 years earlier during a friend‟s life, this is the kind of “non-dramatic 
inconsistency” that does not support an adverse credibility determination.   
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More important, the so-called “inconsistent” testimony and affidavits regarding 
the key issue of Agustin‟s date of entry encompass dates that span less than a two-week 
time period, all in early February 1990.
4
  Cf. Perez Muniz v. Att’y Gen., 363 Fed. Appx. 
973, 974 (3d Cir. 2010) (accepting 1989 entry date of Guatemalan citizen even though his 
removal petition stated he entered the United States in 1991, after he amended his date of 
entry and he, his mother, and his sister testified that he entered in 1989).  Other purported 
inconsistencies in the corroborating affidavits are similarly trivial or nonexistent,
5
 with 
the exception of the entry date provided in Agustin‟s 1994 asylum application discussed 
below.       
Third, the IJ should not have factored the lack of a corroborating affidavit from 
Agustin‟s mother into his credibility determination.  In so doing, the IJ erroneously 
                                              
4
 The dates in Agustin‟s testimony and three corroborating affidavits range only from 
“around February 2nd” to February 10, 1990.  Agustin‟s aunt and uncle both provided 
affidavits stating that Agustin entered the U.S. on February 10, 1990.  A.R. at 493, 495.  
His friend Zepeda-Lucero‟s affidavit also gave an entry date of February 10, 1990.  An 
asylum “investigator here or whoever conducted the interview” provided a hand-written 
entry date of February 15, 1990 in a May 2007 interview that the IJ stated he gave 
“limited weight.”  (IJ Op. at 6).  Agustin testified that he was “not sure exactly” what date 
he entered the U.S., although he thought it was “around the 2nd of February” of 1990. 
A.R at 44.  He stated several times that he knew he entered the U.S. before his 13th 
birthday, which was February 22, 1990.  A.R. at 44-45, 70-72.  His amended asylum 
application (signed in 2007) and his NACARA application also provide a February 1990 
entry date.  The only date outside this two-week period was in Agustin‟s 1994 asylum 
application that was prepared when he was a minor, without a guardian present, in a 
language he did not understand.   
5
 Agustin‟s recounting of events during his childhood that led to his grandparents‟ 
decision to send him to the U.S. to escape the civil war was not internally inconsistent, 
although he described different aspects of the same series of events in his 1994 asylum 
application (that was filled out for him, in a language he did not speak, when he was a 
minor) and his amended 2007 application. 
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conflated the lack of a specific piece of corroborating evidence, which relates to whether 
the evidence before the IJ is sufficient, with lack of credibility.  We have made clear that 
insufficient evidence and a lack of credibility are not legally equivalent.  See, e.g., Chen 
v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is clear that the BIA‟s own rule 
requires a credibility determination to be independent of an analysis of the sufficiency of 
an applicant‟s evidence.”); cf. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 551 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“A failure of proof is not a proper ground per se for an adverse credibility 
determination.”) (emphasis in original).  Moreover, when the IJ questioned Agustin 
regarding why his mother was not at the hearing to testify, he explained that “it was not 
asked of me.”  A.R. at 97.6  In addition, an affidavit from Agustin‟s mother would have 
been second-hand in nature regarding the critical issue of his entry date, as he 
consistently testified that his grandparents sent him to the U.S. from Guatemala and his 
uncle received him upon arrival in Los Angeles.  The lack of an affidavit from Agustin‟s 
mother was not legally relevant to whether his testimony regarding his entry date was 
credible.    
Finally, the only inconsistent entry date, from Agustin‟s 1994 asylum application, 
should not have been given controlling weight merely because that application was 
signed “under penalty of perjury,” as the IJ repeatedly stressed.  (IJ Op. at 6-7).  Instead, 
it should have been given diminished weight for several reasons.  Agustin was a minor 
when the application was filled out.  As he testified before the IJ, a notary completed the 
                                              
6
 Agustin also informed the IJ that his mother was in Guatemala due to an emergency but 
that he could obtain an affidavit from her upon her return if the IJ so desired.   
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application and Agustin had no legal guardian present.  The notary filled out the form in 
English, which Agustin did not understand or read.  Moreover, the notary did not read the 
form back to Agustin in Spanish.  A.R. at 60-61.  Agustin testified that he “had no idea 
what was going on,” that he “didn‟t understand” the form, and that he was “just told to 
sign.  I just signed it.”  A.R. at 77, 73.  While the IJ stated that he would take Agustin‟s 
age into account, he does not appear to have taken notice that the law distinguishes 
between minors and adults in many ways, particularly in regard to their capacity to sign 
legal documents without parental supervision.  See, e.g., 3 Pennsylvania Law 
Encyclopedia, Minors § 3 (2007) (“A minor's formal warrant of attorney is absolutely 
void, and cannot be ratified.”); Doe v. Banos, 713 F.Supp.2d 404, 410 (D.N.J. 2010) 
(discussing “legal difficulties surrounding a minor‟s entry into contractual relations”); 
Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, 630 F. Supp.2d 488, 489 (E.D.P.A. 2008) (an 
unemancipated minor “does not have the legal capacity to sign [forms regarding 
prescription medication]”).  Under these circumstances, the IJ gave undue weight to the 
fact that Agustin‟s 1994 asylum application was signed under penalty of perjury.  Cf. Gui 
Cun Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 529, 534 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing where an IJ did not 
explain why a “presumption” that an adult would be “aware of the contents” of an asylum 
form he signed was rebutted by other evidence).
7
 
                                              
7
 In Gui Cun Liu, as here, the asylum form was filled out by a third-party preparer in 
English, which the applicant did not speak:  
The IJ relied heavily upon Mr. Liu's statement originally filed with 
his signed I-589 form (and later retracted by him), in which it was 
claimed that he had been jailed and fined for failure to comply with 
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*   *   *   *   * 
We conclude that there were multiple legal errors in the determination that 
Agustin did not establish prima facie eligibility for NACARA relief.  If the proper legal 
standards had been followed, and, in turn, the proper evidence had been considered 
without speculation substituted for record evidence, an adverse credibility determination 
regarding Agustin‟s date of entry would not have been made.  Noting the IJ‟s repeated 
statement that he would have found Agustin statutorily eligible for NACARA relief 
absent that determination, we grant the petition with regard to NACARA relief, vacate, 
and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
the one-child policy. A.R. 71-72. The IJ noted that, under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.3, Mr. Liu's signature on the form gave rise to a presumption 
that he was aware of the contents of that application. But the IJ did 
not explain why this presumption had not been successfully rebutted 
by other evidence (most notably, the fact that the form is filled out in 
English, which Mr. Liu does not speak, without listing the name of a 
third-party preparer, as well as Mr. Liu's testimony regarding the 
explanation of the statement before the asylum officer: “I said I 
didn't know what it is”). 
372 F.3d at 534 (internal citation omitted). 
